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NOTES
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND PRESIDENTIAL COMPETENCE:
CONFLICTING POWERS AFFECTING CLAIMS AGAINST
FOREIGN STATES
INTRODucTION
The courts of the United States are empowered to decide "cases"
and "controversies."' A review of those cases which have involved
claims against foreign states reveals, however, that often the courts
have either chosen, or felt compelled, not to decide the case or to ac-
cept disposal of the claim by the Executive. The decision not to adjudi-
cate has often been based on judicial deference to the position,' sugges-
tion,' or perceived basis and necessity for actions of the Executive
Branch.4 At other times the courts have designated cases "political
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hunt (Mobil)]. In this case, where the plaintiff's anti-
trust suit against the defendant was defeated by an act of state defense, the court stated
that the government of the United States had already found the act to be one of a politi-
cal nature and, consequently, that the court was precluded from deciding the case.
In sum, the United States has officially characterized the mo-
tivitation of the Libyan government, the very issue which
Hunt now seeks to adjudicate here .... [T]he American judi-
ciary is being asked to make inquiry into the subtle and deli-
cate issue of the policy of a foreign sovereign, a Serbian Bog,
precluded by the act of state doctrine as well as the realities of
the fact finding competence of the court in an issue of far
reaching national concern.
Id. at 77.
3. See, e.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), a case
where the court accepted a State Department suggestion and granted immunity after
jurisdiction was obtained over a Cuban ship which had been hijacked to the United
States. "The certification and suggestion of immunity, however, which has been made by
the State Department in this matter affecting our foreign relations, withdraws it from
the sphere of litigation." Id. at 26.
4. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). In this recent and
complicated case arising out of the Iranian hostage situation, the Court held that the
questioned presidential actions were supported by both the nature of the situation and
by congressional acquiescence.
But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been deter-
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questions" and, therefore, nonjusticiable'
The courts, in arriving at their decisions in these cases, try to bal-
ance the competing public policy demands of the concerned parties.'
This balancing process has required that the courts harmonize'the de-
mands and expectations of the parties to the controversy with those of
the community, both national and world, as a whole.' The most evi-
dent demands are made by the plaintiff; these demands are that his
claim be adjudicated on the merits and that a remedy be granted. As
claimant he has the expectation that he will be accorded due process of
law, and that his rights, which have arisen under the rule of law, will
be protected. The concept of the rule of law,' and the accompanying
expectation that an injured party can find remedy under law, pervades
the common law. This has been clearly articulated in great foundation
documents such as the Magna Cartag and the Declaration of Indepen-
mined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and
where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in
the President's action, we are not prepared to say that the
President lacks the power to settle such claims.
Id. at 688.
5. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Buttes Gas & Oil]. The
plaintiffs brought an antitrust suit against the defendants regarding a Middle-Eastern
concession agreement. The court, before arriving at a decision based on an act of state
rationale, discussed the impact of a political question. "In our system, the questions of
what are a country's boundaries, or of what nation has sovereignty over a certain piece of
territory, are not for the judiciary to decide; they are political questions, upon which the
courts must be guided and bound by the pronouncements of the executive." Id. at 103.
6. The concept of a balancing test was succinctly articulated by Justice White in
a footnote to the Court's opinion in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
705 n.18 (1976). See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
7. The influence of the policy oriented jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and
Harold Lasswell will be seen throughout this note. The basic concepts of this school are
discussed in Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
362 (1971).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (5th ed. 1979) defines the rule of law as follows:
"The rule of law, sometimes called 'the supremacy of law', provides that decisions should
be made by the application of known principles or laws without the intervention of dis-
cretion in their application." Id.
9. The Magna Carta (G.B. 1215), reprinted in L. B. WRIGHT, MAGNA CARTA AND
THE TRADITION OF LIBERTY 54-58 (1976), stating the rights of free men:
No free man shall be seized or imprisioned, or stripped
of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or deprived of his
standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force
against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judg-
ment of his equals or by the law of the land.
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dence, 10 and supported by decisions of the Supreme Court.1"
The defendant also demands and expects that his rights under
law will be protected. Some defendants believe that their status re-
quires that they be granted an increased measure of respect, and per-
haps even deference, to the extent of freedom from suit.12 This expec-
tation of preferential treatment has been demanded, and to an extent
recognized, in domestic situations in which the President has been a
party.1 3 The demand for respect, perhaps more commonly described as
To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or
justice.
Id. at 56.
10. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) describing the transgressions of
the King. "He has obstructed the administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to
Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers." Id. para. 10. "He has made Judges dependent
on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries." Id. para. 11.
11. The Supreme Court, in its early years, clearly stated its respect for the rule
of law. In Marbury v. Madison the Court stated that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the rule of law and the Court's primacy in its
interpretation in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the
others, the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the
federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more
be shared with the Executive branch than the Chief Execu-
tive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power,
or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override
a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to
the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and
balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government.
The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (S. Mittell ed. 1938). We there-
fore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to
say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege
presented in this case.
Id. at 704-05.
12. See, e.g., Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
13. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704-05.
Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality
of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II pow-
ers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of
each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional du-
ties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of
enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of
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comity, 4 has been strongly asserted when the defendant is a nation
state or an entity which is an extension of a nation state.15 The protec-
tion of its "sovereignty," and of its sovereign rights implicit in the de-
mand for respect, is of great concern to a nation state and has been
often and strongly articulated. 6 This demand for respect by foreign
states has been both recognized and granted by the Supreme Court.
17
In addition to the parties in a suit, others are concerned with the
adjudicatory process and make demands on the courts. Primary among
these other actors 8 is the Executive Branch of the government of the
United States.
The Executive, which has a significant, if not dominant, role to
play in the foreign affairs of this country,19 has often suggested to the
courts that it stands in a uniquely delicate position.2 0 This position, it
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (4th ed. 1968) describes comity of nations as:
"[tihe most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obliga-
tion of the laws of one nation within the territories of another. . . .That body of rules
which states observe towards one another from courtesy or mutual convenience, although
they do not form part of international law." Id.
15. See, e.g., Novosti, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) where the defense of
sovereign immunity was strongly asserted, and recognized, when a Soviet press instru-
mentality was sued for libel.
16. In Novosti, the Soviet Union not only pressed its claim for immunity in
court, but also sought an affirmative Department of State position on the same issue. Id.
at 851 n.1. See Department of State correspondence and commentary in 1977 DIG. U.S.
PRAC. INT'L L. 515.
17. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and
being bound by obligations of the highest character not to de-
grade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sover-
eign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed
to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in
the confidence that the immunities belonging to his indepen-
dent sovereign stations, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
This perfect quality and absolute independence of sov-
ereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual
intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each
other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sover-
eign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that com-
plete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated
to be the attribute of every nation.
Id. at 137.
18. Other actors include the Legislative Branch, commentators and other inter-
ested third parties.
19. The Court has recognized the Executive's role in, for example, United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See also infra notes 71-90 and ac-
companying text.
20. In Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196
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has been suggested, requires that a free hand be given to the Executive
when it is dealing with other nations, a free hand which should remain
unfettered by judicial action."' In short, the Executive is demanding
that the Judiciary recognize its claims for power to operate in foreign
affairs and for respect and deference to this proper exercise of power."s
The Legislative Branch is also an interested, although often si-
lent, actor in these dramas. The Congress, concerned with the "inter-
ests of justice and. . . the rights of both foreign states and litigants in
United States courts, 2 3 has enacted various pieces of legislation re-
flecting congressional demands. The Legislative Branch has attempted
to communicate to the Judicial Branch its belief and demand that the
Executive should not be allowed solely to establish the foreign policy of
the United States through influence on the Judiciary;2' that the claim-
ants should, to a significant extent, have their claims adjudicated on
the merits;' 8 that the Judiciary should, if possible, function freely;se
and implicitly, that they, the Congress, should be afforded recognition
of their power, and respect for their right, to influence some of the
foreign affairs of the nation.
7
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Umm al
Qaywayn], the court of appeals quoted a Department of State letter, contained in an
amicus brief:
We believe that the political sensitivity of territorial issues,
the need for unquestionable U.S. neutrality and the harm to
our foreign relations which may otherwise ensue, as well as the
evidentiary and jurisprudential difficulties for a U.S. court to
determine such issues, are compelling grounds for judicial
abstention.
Id. at 1204 n.13.
21. Id.
22. The response of the Court to these executive demands in the area of sover-
eign immunity is discussed infra text accompanying notes 124-45.
23. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a),
1391(f), 1602-1611 (1976) [hereinafter cited as F.S.I.A.].
24. See F.S.I.A., supra note 23; Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d)(4), 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sabbatino Amendment]; see also discus-
sion infra text accompanying notes 196-99.
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6604 [hereinafter cited as House REpORT].
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determina-
tion of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the
judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implica-
tions of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that
these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds
and under procedures that insure due process.
Id. at 6606.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6611.
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The Judicial Branch also has expectations with regard to its own
function within the legal process. The courts, while recognizing the
roles of the other actors and the conflicting demands made on them,
have often stated the primacy of their position in determining the law
and have demanded respect for this position."
This note will examine the relationships among the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial Branches when a claim against a foreign state
is litigated. There will be a close examination of the demands and ex-
pectations of all the actors involved in this process. This examination
will focus on past judicial decisions, on legislative and executive ac-
tions, and on the current status of the relationship between the three
branches of government. This note will examine the demands made on
the courts by the various actors, the courts' reactions to these de-
mands, the rationale offered for these reactions, and the effect of these
decisions. Finally, attention will be given to that almost unacknowl-
edged demand and expectation, one which is the common demand of
the American community, that, except in the most extraordinary of cir-
cumstances, the courts should decide claims which are properly
brought before them.2' This may be stated as the demand for the rule
of law. The absence of attention to this demand in past decisions, and
the current uncertainty regarding the courts' ability or willingness8° to
decide claims against foreign states, will be reviewed. This analysis is
divided into:
1. The Problem: The uncertainty of authorita-
tive decision when the Executive and Judici-
ary collide.
2. The Roles of the Judicial, Executive and Leg-
islative Branches: An overview of the nature
and source of judicial authority, an examina-
tion of the role of the Executive in foreign af-
28. See e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). "It is ... the ... duty of
the judicial department, to say what the law is." Id. at 177. See also infra notes 65-68
and accompanying text.
29. The belief that the courts should extend their authority to cases properly
before them is expressed in THE FEDmAST Nos. 78 and 81 (A. Hamilton) and in the
HousE REPORT, supra note 25.
30. See the confused case of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (I.A.M.) v. Org. of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.), 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as I.A.M. v. O.P.E.C.], where, in an antitrust ac-
tion against O.P.E.C., the district court entered judgment for the defendants on the basis
of sovereign immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed, not on the grounds of sover-
eign immunity, but on act of state.
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fairs, and the nature and effect of legislative
action.
3. Acts of executive suggestion and judicial def-
erence in the areas of sovereign immunity, act
of state, political question, and the removal
from the courts, or settlement of claims, by
presidential action.
1. The Problem
The most basic statement of the problem which arises from the
intervention of the Executive in the judicial process when a claim
against a foreign state is litigated is that there have been unjust deci-
sions, that is, cases where the courts have not decided a claim on its
merits, but on other considerations, or have found the case to be non-
justiciable. This intervention has resulted in an absence of authorita-
tive decision, a result which has been both highly praised 3 and harshly
criticized. 2
Two controversial cases which have been criticized for the unfair-
ness of their result illustrate this point.33 In Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino" the Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine 5
precluded an examination of the validity of the taking of property of
an American corporation by the Cuban government, even where the
taking was alleged to be without substantive compensation, and, there-
fore, in violation of international law.8" This decision had the result of
ensuring that the corporation would have to endure the loss of its
property without compensation and without any remedy at law.
37
31. See, e.g., Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions:
Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963).
32. See, e.g., Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?,
40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
33. Other controversial cases criticized for their holdings, their reasoning, or
both, include Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), discussed infra notes 128-131 and
accompanying text; Rich, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), discussed infra notes 140-145 and
accompanying text; Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hunt
(Coastal States)], discussed infra text accompanying notes 227-31.
34. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
35. The act of state doctrine, whereby the courts of the United States will not
judge an act of a foreign state taken within its own boundaries, is fully examined infra
text accompanying notes 157-249.
36. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
37. This case has been the subject of extensive analysis, and both positive and
negative commentary. In the latter vein, see McDougal & Jasper, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976; Some Suggested Amendments, in PRrvATE INvESTORS ABROAD 1,
19821
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In Dames & Moore v. Regan" the Supreme Court upheld the
President's competence to suspend claims against Iran which were
pending in American courts38 in order to effectuate the Iranian Agree-
ments.40 The effect of this decision was that a judgment rendered by a
court of the United States' 1 was suspended, and the claim was trans-
ferred to a settlement tribunal4' without any certainty of success or
satisfaction. Although the assets, which had been frozen, were recog-
nized by the Court to be a "bargaining chip"' in the bilateral negotia-
tions, the Court found that the nullification of the attachment and the
transfer of the assets did not constitute a taking under the fifth
amendment.
44
As significant as these unjust decisions are, the problem arising
from this practice of nonadjudication has broader dimensions. Its most
significant aspects are that there is uncertainty as to when the courts
will apply a particular doctrine, the manner in which such doctrine will
be applied and the effect of executive intervention in this process."5
It is true that at least a partial consensus has developed around
the meaning of certain key concepts.'" Act of state has been described
as a doctrine whereby the courts of one nation will not judge those acts
taken by another country within its own territory.47 Sovereign immu-
nity, on the other hand, affects the jurisdiction of the court; when sov-
ereign immunity is found, the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the
case.'8 A political question goes to neither choice of law nor jurisdic-
tion. Rather, a case because of its sensitive nature is found to be non-
68 nn. 99-100 (Southwestern Legal Foundation ed. 1981). For positive commentary, see
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 216-20 (1972).
38. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
39. Id. at 688.
40. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria and Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-United States-Alge-
ria, 81 DEP'T ST. BuLL. No. 2047, 1-5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Agreements].
41. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. 79-04918 LEW
(Px) (C.D. Cal.), at 27, cited at 453 U.S. 654, 664 n.4 (1981).
42. 453 U.S. at 665.
43. Id. at 673.
44. Id. at 674 n.6. See the dissent of Justice Powell discussed infra note 337 and
accompanying text. The Court did not decide whether the claim suspension constituted a
fifth amendment taking. See 453 U.S. at 688-90.
45. See HousE REPoRT, supra note 25, at 6607.
46. The Supreme Court has discussed the various aspects of these concepts in
some detail in First Natl City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
47. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
48. I.A.M. v. O.P.E.C., 477 F. Supp. at 565.
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justiciable under this doctrine.4 ' Finally, the Supreme Court has held
that when the President, operating with the acquiescence of Congress,
seeks to resolve a foreign affairs crisis through an agreement, he may
temporarily suspend the jurisdiction of the United States courts and
transfer claims against the foreign state to an international tribunal.5 0
Even though there is some consensus on the definitions given
above, there continues to be confusion in their application."' This has
resulted in uncertainty in the minds of claimants as they seek adjudi-
cation of the issues." This uncertainty can only be compounded by
episodic intervention by the Executive in the judicial process.
Finally, it is necessary to be aware that these problems in applica-
tion, which can sometimes result in unjust decisions and confusion in
the decision-making process, perhaps reflect not a failing of the Ameri-
can judicial process, but a strength. The Constitution with its enumer-
ated and implied powers5" has created a balance and a tension between
the three branches of government. The Judicial Branch fulfills its con-
stitutional mandate,"4 and operates for the good of the country, in ad-
vancing the rule of law. The Executive Branch fulfills its constitutional
mandate,5  and operates for the good of the country, by interjecting
itself into the rule of law. The Legislative Branch fulfills its constitu-
tional mandate," and operates for the good of the country, by enacting
legislation designed to clarify and delimit the boundaries of the func-
tional powers possessed by the other branches. Although the full exer-
cise of each branch's constitutional function is beneficial to the Ameri-
can legal process, there has nonetheless been conflict in the exercise of
these powers. This conflict has inevitably led to unjust decisions and
confusions in the application of law.
2. Roles of the Judicial, Executive and Legislative Branches
a. The Sources of Judicial Authority
The Supreme Court's authority" is delimited by the Constitu-
49. Umm al Qaywayn, 577 F.2d at 1203.
50. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688.
51. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
52. See HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 6607.
53. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
54. See U.S. CONST. art. III. See also infra note 58 and accompanying text.
55. See U.S. CONST. art. II. See also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
56. See U.S. CONsT. art. I. See also infra text accompanying note 93.
57. See generally R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMEaSTc CoURTs IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1964); L. HENKIN, supra note 37; Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor:
The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 633 (1962); Leigh
19821
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tion, 58 but its strength comes from the concept of the rule of law." The
rule of law is the philosophical position, in the English common law
system, that law should prevail over might.10 Further, commentary
contemporaneous with the Constitution has supported the role of the
courts and the rule of law as opposed to the rule of men."1 Finally, this
constitutional mandate has been given effect through the rules of judi-
cial procedure.6 2
The Supreme Court has from its earliest years enunciated its role
under the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation for
the authority of the judiciary under the Constitution in the classic case
& Atkeson, Due Process in the Emerging Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
pts. 1 & 2, 21 Bus. LAW. 853 (1966), 22 Bus. LAW. 3 (1966); Lillich, The Proper Role of
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970); NOTE,
The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary: The State Department as the Su-
preme Court of International Law, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1968). The above cited mate-
rial discusses not only the nature and extent of the Supreme Court's authority, but also
potential and real conflicts between that authority and the powers of the other branches.
58. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; .. . to Controversies . . . be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
Id.
59. See supra note 8.
60. See supra note 9.
61. See generally THE FEDERALIST, supra note 29.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions . . . between-
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
State;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or sub-
jects of a foreign State are additional parties; and




of Marbury v. Madison.3 "The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of govern-
ment is to afford that protection."" Regarding the role of the Judici-
ary, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[i]t is, emphatically, the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is. Those




This jurisdiction has been strongly expounded by the Judiciary
when a member of the bench believes that a court is shrinking from its
constitutional mandate. "I start with what I thought to be unassailable
propositions: that our courts are obliged to determine controversies on
their merits, in accordance with the applicable law. .... ,"" In another
instance, "[w]e are adjudicating legal issues and I certainly should not
have to emphasize that legal issues are resolved by the judicial branch
of our government, not the executive branch. '67 The Supreme Court,
in addition to defining its own role under the Constitution, has ex-
pressly rejected the concept of the rule of man.6 8
Yet in spite of the above constitutional language and judicial ut-
terances, the courts have often refrained from deciding cases by defer-
ring to executive power or actions in foreign affairs.6 This process has
been described by Professor Henkin as follows:
The courts have . . . established their final and
"infallible" authority to impose their readings of
the Constitution on the political branches of the
federal government as well as on the States ....
But foreign affairs make a difference.
The courts are less willing than elsewhere to curb
63. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
64. Id. at 163.
65. Id. at 177.
66. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 450-51 (White, J., dissenting).
67. Chem. Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venez., 420 Pa. 134, 179, 215 A.2d 864, 886,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
68. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. For a more recent commitment to the
rule of law, and a finding that even the President is not above the law, see Nixon, .418
U.S. at 708-16.
69. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Umm al Qaywayn, 577 F.2d 1196
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Hunt (Mobil), 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
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the political branches and have even developed
doctrines of special deference to them."
These acts of "deference" arising in the conflict between the Judicial
and Executive Branches are examined in this note. Before exploring
them in detail, however, it is necessary to review the sources and limits
of the Executive's power in foreign affairs.
b. The Role of the Executive in Foreign Affairs
The authority of the President in foreign affairs has its founda-
tion in the enumerated powers of the Constitution." The present in-
quiry is concerned with whether the implied powers of the President
sanction his actions as exceptions to judicial authority and the rule of
law.
The concept of exceptions to judicial authority was clearly stated
early in the 19th century by Chief Justice Marshall as he determined
the validity of the judicial appointments in Marbury v. Madison.
7
1 "It
behooves us, then, to inquire whether there be in its [the case] compo-
sition any ingredient which shall exempt it from legal investigation, or
exclude the injured party from legal redress." '
The courts have found the foreign affairs power of the President
to be an "ingredient" which would prevent the full exercise of judicial
authority.74 The concept of foreign affairs as this type of "ingredient"
was first formulated by the then Secretary of State Marshall. "The
President is the sole organ in its external relations, and its sole repre-
70. L. HENKIN, supra note 37, at 205-06 (footnotes omitted).
71. U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1-3.
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America. [Id. § 1, cl. 1.]
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States .... [Id. § 2, cl. 1.1
He shall have Power, by and with the Advise and Con-
sent of the Senate to make Treaties .... [Id. § 2, cl. 2.]
. . . [H]e shall receive Ambassadors .... [Id. § 3.]
72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
73. Id. at 163.
74. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The act of state doctrine's "continuing
vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between
the judicial and political branches of the government on matters bearing upon foreign
affairs." Id. at 427-28.
The courts have relied on act of state and a variety of other rationales in finding
foreign affairs to be an "ingredient" which would compel the nonadjudication of a case.
For a discussion of these various rationales, see infra note 127 and text accompanying
notes 127, 188, 275 & 331.
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sentative with foreign nations. '7 5
The basic formulation was quoted with approval and expanded
upon in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.7  In this case
the President, pursuant to a congressional resolution 77 prohibited the
sale of arms to Bolivia. Defendant Curtiss-Wright was prosecuted for
violating that embargo.78 The Supreme Court found that the President
was dealing with sensitive and complex matters when he conducted
foreign affairs. As a result, the President, with the authorization of
Congress, was found to have validly instituted the embargo.
7'
It is significant to note that in Curtiss-Wright the Court relied
heavily on the authorization for action given to the President by Con-
gress.6 0 The courts in subsequent cases continued to evaluate the ex-
tent of congressional authorization for presidential actions.81 The Su-
preme Court made one of its broadest statements of deference to
executive actions in foreign affairs in Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.2 In holding that presidential regu-
lations governing foreign air routes, made pursuant to congressional
authorization, were "political," "complex" and ultimately nonjusticia-
ble, the Court reached what may be the high water mark in deference
to the Executive."8
75. Secretary of State Marshall addressing the House of Representatives in 1800,
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800), quoted in Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
76. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
77. Id. at 311-12.
78. Id. at 311.
79. Id. at 319.
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over
external affairs in origin and essential character different from
that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of
the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm,
with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen
as a representative of the nation ....
Id.
80. Id. at 320.
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing
not alone with an authority vested in the President by an ex-
ception of legislative power, but with such an authority plus
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of in-
ternational relations ....
Id. at 319-20.
81. See discussion of Dames & Moore, infra text accompanying notes 329-44;
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
82. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
83. Id. at 111.
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The nature and extent of any congressional authorization was
subjected to an intensive analysis by the Supreme Court in a case in-
volving a domestic matter, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.84
In invalidating President Truman's takeover of the nation's steel mills
during a labor conflict, the Court found that the President had ex-
ceeded his enumerated and implied powers and that he had operated
not only without congressional authorization, but in a manner incom-
patible with congressional intent."5 This was clearly stated in Justice
Jackson's famous three part analysis."0 This analysis, where presiden-
tial actions were either "pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, 8 7 "in absence of either a congressional grant or de-
nial of authority,"8 or "[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,"89 has
withstood the test of time and is part of the basis for the Court's deci-
sion in the recent Iranian settlement case. 9
c. The Nature and Effect of Legislative Actions
It has been seen that the competency of the President in foreign
affairs extends significantly beyond those enumerated powers found in
the Constitution.9 While this competence has sometimes been en-
hanced by a grant of power by Congress,"2 on other occasions, however,
Congress has acted to limit the President's role. 93
vices whose reports are not and ought not to be published to
the world .... But even if courts could require full disclosure,
the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is
political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by
our Constitution to the political departments of the govern-
ment, Executive and Legislative .... They are decisions of a
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude nor respon-
sibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain
of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Id.
84. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
85. Id. at 585-89.
86. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 635.
88. Id. at 637.
89. Id. at 637.
90. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 71-90.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96 and 196-205.
93. Congress has attempted to limit the Executive's action in armed conflict
through the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Publ. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). There
was also an unsuccessful effort by Senator Bricker to limit the competence of a President
in the treaty making area. See H. BUTLER, CONSTrrUTONAL AMENDMENT RELATIVE TO
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Congress has twice acted in regard to the President's ability to
affect matters which were before the Judiciary. In 1963, as part of the
Sabbatino Amendment,' Congress authorized the President to inter-
vene in act of state cases by making suggestions to the Judiciary."
While on its face a power granting provision prescribing the presiden-
tial power by statute, it, in reality, has the effect of making this hereto-
fore implied power subject to congressional revocation. The act of state
doctrine is currently under study by Senator Mathias. It is possible
that this authorization will be reviewed and potentially curtailed by
Congress."
Congress also acted specifically to limit the power of the Presi-
dent by the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976."
Here, Congress expressly reasserted the preeminence of the rule of law
and emphasized the role of the courts 8 as the body which says "what
the law is."9 In enacting this measure Congress ended the long-stand-
ing executive practice of suggesting sovereign immunity to the courts
which almost invariably resulted in judicial deference to the Execu-
tive's position.100
Although Congress has sporadically enacted legislation addressing
the conflicts between the Executive and Judicial Branches, these ef-
forts have not been frequent nor have they been uniform in effect. For
example, it can be seen that the Sabbatino Amendment, which permits
executive suggestion in act of state cases, can conflict with the F.S.I.A.
was also an unsuccessful effort by Senator Bricker to limit the competence of a President
in the treaty making area. See H. BuTLzR, CONSTrruTIONAL AMENDMzNT RELATIVE TO
TRATIES AND ExEcUTIw AGRs-amEErs, S. Jun. REp. No. 412, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
94. Sabbatino Amendment, supra note 24. A discussion of the Sabbatino
Amendment in the act of state context may be found in the text accompanying notes
196-205 infra.
95. The law in part provides:
Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable...
(2) in any case with respect to which the President determines
that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that
particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United
States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in
that case with the court.
Sabbatino Amendment, supra note 24.
96. See S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see also infra note 203.
97. See supra note 23.
98. F.S.I.A., supra note 23, § 1602. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity
with the principles set forth in this chapter." Id.
99. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
100. For a discussion of sovereign immunity and its impact on the judicial pro-
cess, see infra text accompanying notes 103-56.
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grant of authority to the courts. ' It is clear that, while there is some
awareness of the conflicting roles of the Executive and Judiciary, Con-
gress has heretofore been unwilling or unable to effectuate a compre-
hensive solution and that this tension between the Executive and Judi-
ciary will continue.1"2
The question of balance is thus delimited as the essential right of
an individual to seek remedy for an injury through the established ju-
dicial process weighed against the power of the Executive to preclude
suits under its foreign affairs power. The following sections review at-
tempts to decide these cases and to apply these sometimes conflicting
legal principles, attempts which have met with varying degrees of
success.
3. Review of Acts of Executive Suggestion and Judicial Deference
a. Sovereign Immunity
Although Chief Justice Marshall had, in an early opinion, stated
that it is the "duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is," 1" it was, nevertheless, the same Justice Marshall who found an
exception to that duty in the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
10 4
Sovereign immunity is "a doctrine of international law under
which domestic courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction
over a foreign state."110 5 It is significant to recognize, as stated in the
above definition, that sovereign immunity is an international law doc-
trine that causes a court to relinquish jurisdiction. Such immunity
101. This might occur when a court is deciding a case under the exception to act
of state formulated in Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 706, and the President makes a suggestion
under the Sabbatino Amendment which would lead to the mandatory application of the
act of state doctrine. See Sabbatino Amendment infra note 196.
102. See discussion of Dames & Moore infra text accompanying notes 329-44.
The Supreme Court attempted to interpret some uncertain congressional signals in a
case involving a conflict between executive and judicial powers.
103. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
104. See generally Cardozo, supra note 31; Frank, The Courts, The State De-
partment and National Policy: A Criterion For Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. L. Rv.
1101 (1960); Goodman, Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: A Political or Legal Ques-
tion-Victory Transport Revisited, 38 BaooKLxN L. Rav. 885 (1972); Jessup, supra note
32; Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in
Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); McDougal &
Jasper, supra note 37; Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the
Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAm L. Rav. 543 (1977); Note, Sovereign Immu-
nity-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18
HAutv. INT'L L. Rav. 429 (1977).
105. House REPORT, supra note 25, at 6606.
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takes a defendant outside the rule of law. This section reviews the con-
ceptualization of this doctrine and its evolution in the American legal
process.
Although the concept of sovereign immunity had been alluded to
in prior cases,'" its first full articulation was given by Justice Marshall
in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.107 In this landmark case the
Chief Justice articulated the fundamental issues which have infused
not only the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but also the doctrines of
act of state, political question and presidential claim transfer, from
1812 to the present day. 08
In Schooner Exchange Justice Marshall recognized that each of
the actors was making a demand on the judicial process, some seeking
an exception from it, and others expecting a decision which would rec-
ognize and protect the rule of law.'" After analyzing the demands and
the underlying policies in this case, sovereign immunity was brought
forth as an exception to the rule of law by the Supreme Court, an ex-
ception which still has viable elements in the legal arena.
The Schooner Exchange had been owned by Maryland merchants
until its seizure by the government of France." 0 The Schooner Ex-
change was converted into a warship,' and as such, it sailed into the
Philadelphia harbor where defendants brought suit for possession."'
In an extensive analysis Chief Justice Marshall first recognized
the common interest in orderly commerce between nations.18 He rec-
106. See DeMoitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F. Cas. 574 (Adm. Ct. of Pa. 1781)
(No. 9697).
107. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
108. Compare Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) with Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (claim settlement), Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (act of state)
and Umm al Qaywayn, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979)
(political question). In each of these cases, the court deciding the case had to balance the
claims of the plaintiff, the claims and rights of the foreign states involved, the power of
the Executive and the role of the Judiciary. Each of these factors had been recognized as
important by Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange. See infra notes 113-20 and
accompanying text.
109. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146-47. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 117.
111. For a discussion of the seizure and conversion of the schooner Exchange
into a French warship, see id. at 116-20, 135 & 147.
112. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 118-19.
113. Id. at 136. Chief Justice Marshall recognized the interdependence of world
commerce even in a nineteenth century world.
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is
prompted by intercourse with each other, and by an in-
terchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and
its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxa-
1982]
N.Y.J. INT'L & Comp. L.
ognized that there was a common demand and expectation that the
wealth and respect of all the actors be protected. 1 4 The demand by
foreign states that their sovereignty be respected was also acknowl-
edged." 5 Chief Justice Marshall further recognized that the individual
claimant was demanding that his claim be recognized and
adjudicated. 1
Chief Justice Marshall then meticulously evaluated the facts of
the case, the principles to be applied, the need to balance the previ-
ously recognized common interest in orderly commerce and the de-
mands for respect by the sovereign nations." 7 In this analysis he dis-
tinguished those acts of the sovereign which were public acts from
those acts which were commercial in nature, thus foreshadowing the
jure imperii-jure gestionis distinction,"1 before extending immunity
to the warship.1
tion, in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances,
of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respec-
tive territories which sovereignty confers.
Id.
114. Id. at 144.
When private individuals of one nation spread them-
selves through another, as business or caprice may direct,
mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other,
or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it
would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and
would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the govern-
ment to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not
owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to
the jurisdiction of the country.
Id.
115. Id. at 137. Chief Justice Marshall stated that:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and
being bound by obligations of the highest character not to de-
grade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or his sover-
eign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed
to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in
the confidence that the immunities belonging to his indepen-
dent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are re-
served by implication, and will be extended to him.
Id.
116. Id. at 146-47. "Every person, it is alleged, who is entitled to property
brought within the jurisdiction of our courts, has a right to assert his title in those
courts, unless there be some law taking his case out of the general rule." Id.
117. Id.
118. In the twentieth century the distinction between an act which embodied a
state function, jure imperii, and an act which was private in nature, jure gestionis, was
made. See infra text accompanying note 132.
119. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145.
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Marshall also provided a possible mechanism for the Executive
Branch to reveal that the warship entered United States waters under
an implied promise of exemption from jurisdiction. "If this opinion be
correct, there seems to be a necessity for admitting that the fact might
be disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the attorney for the
United States.120
The foregoing comprehensive analysis was not, however, followed
by subsequent courts as they adhered rigidly to the absolute theory of
immunity which holds that a state has immunity whether its acts are
imperii or gestionis.12s In Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro,",
a ship owned and controlled by the Italian government was sued for
failure to deliver cargo. In this case the Supreme Court extended the
concept of immunity to a ship engaged in commercial activity.2
The Supreme Court further concretized its method of determin-
ing sovereign immunity as the possiblity of executive suggestion of-
fered by Chief Justice Mashall s1 2 became a talisman.12 5 In Ex Parte
Republic of Peru"' where the Supreme Court extended immunity to a
Without indicating any opinion on this question, it may
be safely affirmed, that there is a manifest distinction between
the private property of the person who happens to be a prince,
and that military force which supports the sovereign power,
and maintains the dignity and the independence of a nation. A
prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may
possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the terri-
torial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down
the prince, and assuming the character of a private individual;
but this he cannot be presumed to do, with respect to any por-
tion of that armed force, which upholds his crown, and the
nation that he is intrusted to govern.
Id.
120. Id. at 147.
121. The absolute theory of immunity holds generally that a state has immunity
whether its acts are jure imperii or jure gestionis. The United States moved away from
this doctrine in the 1950's with the "Tate" letter. See infra note 133 and accompanying
text.
122. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
123. Id. at 574.
We think the principles are applicable alike to all ships held
and used by a government for a public purpose, and that
when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people or
providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires,
mans and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public
ships in the same sense that war ships are.
Id.
124. See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147.
125. See infra notes 126-31.
126. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
1982]
N.Y.J. INT'L & Coup. L.
Peruvian ship following a State Department suggestion so as not to
"embarrass" the Executive,12 7 and in Mexico v. Hoffman '2  where a
vessel, which returned part of its profits to the Mexican government,
was sued for damage caused to an American vessel,'3 ' the Court articu-
lated a position of extreme deference to the Executive.' 80 The harden-
ing of this concept of deference resulted in significant negative
commentary.1s1
The next major change in sovereign immunity related to the
adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity. This was prompted, to
a significant extent, by the adoption of the restrictive theory by many
127. Id. at 588. The concept of embarrassment to the Executive was criticized by
Monroe Leigh. Leigh, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 187.
Some will say, of course, that it is necessary for the State De-
partment to intrude in certain cases where judicial action may
embarrass the President in the conduct of foreign policy. I
agree with Professor Lillich that this is "one of the most over-
rated arguments in the annals of American legal history." It
would be useful if someone would list the cases in which court
action has embarrassed the Executive Branch in any signifi-
cant way in the conduct of foreign affairs.
Id. at 192.
128. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
129. Id. at 31.
130. Id. at 35. In neither Peru nor Mexico did the Court proceed through the
sophisticated analysis that was done by Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange.
The Court, in each case, while fully recognizing the demands of the defendant nation
and the Executive Branch, did not review the subtle shadings of the demands and expec-
tations of other actors. In Peru the Court states: "Upon recognition and allowance of the
claim by the State Department and certification of its action presented to the court by
the Attorney General, it is the court's duty to surrender the vessel and remit the libelant
to the relief obtainable through diplomatic negotiations." 318 U.S. at 588.
In Mexico the Court relied on a rigid interpretation of Schooner Exchange to
establish a foundation for an extension of the concept of judicial deference.
And in The Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall introduced the
practice, since followed in the federal courts, that their juris-
diction in rem acquired by the judicial seizure of the vessel of
a friendly foreign government, will be surrendered on recogni-
tion, allowance and certification of the asserted immunity by
the political branch of the government charged with the con-
duct of foreign affairs when its certificate to that effect is
presented to the court by the Attorney General.
324 U.S. at 34.
Finally, in Mexico the Court extended the concept of deference to its limits: "It is
therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize." Id. at 35 (footnote omitted).
131. See, e.g., Jessup, supra note 32.
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of the Western Nations.18 2 The adoption of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity by the United States was accomplished through
the "Tate" letter.1 8  This letter, written by the Acting State Depart-
ment Legal Advisor to the Acting Attorney General, stated the State
Department's determination that the absolute doctrine was no longer
applicable in a modern world.18 4 In the future the State Department
would follow the restrictive doctrine, recognizing sovereign immunity
only for acts that were jure imperii, not jure gestionis."36 Significantly,
Tate recognized a more flexible standard for the concept of judicial
deference than the courts themselves.
It is realized that a shift in policy by the execu-
tive cannot control the courts but it is felt that
the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sover-
eign immunity where the executive has declined
to do so. There have been indications that at least
some Justices of the Supreme Court feel that in
this matter courts should follow the branch of the
Government charged with responsibility for the
conduct of foreign relations.'"
The years following the Tate letter saw confusion in the courts as
they attempted to conform their decisions to State Department sugges-
tions when they were made18 7 and to arrive at their own determina-
132. See Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INr'L L. 220 (1951). For further recognition of this trend in the
"Tate" letter, see infra text accompanying notes 133-34.
133. Letter from Jack B. Tate, State Department Acting Legal Advisor, to Act-
ing Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952),
reprinted in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 647 (1976).
134. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 133, at 647.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 649. Tate, in advocating the restrictive doctrine, was following a posi-
tion first proposed by Secretary of State Lansing in a letter to Attorney General George
in 1918. Although the Attorney General rejected this position, Lansing articulated the
concept of judicial independence while recognizing the various demands and expecta-
tions of the concerned actors and the aggregate demands of the community. Letter from
Secretary Lansing to Attorney General George (Nov. 8, 1918), reprinted in 2 G. HACK-
WORTh, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429-30 (1941).
137. See, e.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Isbrandtsen Tank-
ers, Inc. v. India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich, 295
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. S. Vietnam, 275 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Weilmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1959); Natural Resources, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822
(1966).
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tions in the absence of a suggestion.' However, there began to emerge
a line of thought which reasserted the independence of the
Judiciary."3 9
Despite these judicial utterances, the courts deferred to executive
suggestions in cases which would, on their faces, seem to be under the
restrictive doctrine. In Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.,' ° the crew of a
Cuban ship defected and brought the ship to the United States where
a libel claim was filed against the ship based on a previous consent
judgment and other commercial actions.'"' The court of appeals duti-
fully accepted the Executive's suggestion'42 in a decision that has been
characterized as political. 4 ' The State Department suggestion came in
response to an agreement with Cuba providing for the return of hi-
jacked vessels.1 4" This process wherein foreign states would lobby with
the State Department for favorable dispensations of immunity based
on political considerations was harshly criticized."'
In 1976 Congress, seeking to ensure that decisions would be made
on purely legal grounds,'" enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976' 41 and reinforced the authority of the courts.' 48 Congress,
in passing this legislation, recognized the aggregate common interest
first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall,149 the demands and expec-
tations of the claimants,5 0 and the respect due the Judiciary,'' while
138. See, e.g., Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
139. See, e.g., Nat'l City Bank v. Repub. of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). "Unlike
the special position accorded our states as party defendants by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the privileged position of a foreign state is not an explicit command of the Consti-
tution. It rests on considerations of policy given legal sanction by this Court." Id. at 358-
59.
140. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
141. Id. at 25.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Leigh & Atkeson, pt. 2, supra note 57, at 19.
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id. at 15-23.
146. HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 6606.
147. See F.S.I.A., supra note 23.
148. Id. § 1602. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be de-
cided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the princples
set forth in this chapter." Id.
149. HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 6605. "At the hearings on the hill it was
pointed out that American citizens are increasingly coming into contact with foreign
states and entities owned by foreign states. .. .In a modern world where foreign state
enterprises are everyday participants in commercial activities, H.R. 11315 is urgently
needed legislation." Id.
150. Id. "These interactions arise in a variety of circumstances, and they call into
question whether our citizens will have access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary
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it implicitly rejected the threat of executive embarrassment.
After passage of the F.S.I.A., the State Department stated that it
would no longer send suggestions to the courts, but would appear "as
amicus curiae in cases of significant interest to the Government.'1
5 2
This stated position was followed in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press
Agency, 58 where the State Department refused a request of the Soviet
Embassy to suggest immunity to the courts.'" It is significant that the
State Department refused to continue its past practice of making sug-
gestions of immunity to the courts; instead it allowed the courts to say
"what the law is." 5 5
Thus, almost 170 years after Schooner Exchange,"' the courts
have been reestablished in their primary role in claim adjudication
when the defense of sovereign immunity is raised. The next sections
evaluate whether this primary role is recognized, or is limited, when
other legal technicalities are at work.
b. Act of State
The act of state'57 doctrine, although it has its roots in English
Law,'" was given its first full articulation in the United States by the
legal disputes." Id.
151. Id. at 6606.
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determina-
tion of Sovereign Immunity from the executive branch to the
judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implica-
tions of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that
these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds
and under procedures that insure due process.
Id.
152. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to the
Attorney General (Nov. 10, 1976), reprinted in 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 323.
153. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
154. Id. at 851 n.1.
155. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
156. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
157. See generally Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Ab-
stention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972); Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in
Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964); Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024
(1967); Note, The Act of State Doctrine: A History of Judicial Limitations and Excep-
tions, 18 H~Av. INT'L L.J. 677 (1977); Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act
of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 590 (1980).
158. Singer, The Act of State Doctrine of the United Kingdom: An Analysis
with Comparisons to United States Practice, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 283 (1981).
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Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez.15 9 In this case the plaintiff
sued the commander of a revolutionary army for damages resulting
from detention.""0 The Court uttered the now classic definition of act
of state, "[elvery sovereign state is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign state, and the court of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory."' 1' This case and its famous statement have had the ef-
fect of creating, after a limited analysis of applicable legal principles,",
a judicial exception to the rule of law. First, the Court did not find
itself devoid of jurisdiction, but rather chose to forgo an adjudication
out of respect for the sovereignty of the foreign state. 1 3 Recent re-
search has found this language to be nearly identical with a leading
British case'" basing immunity on the unassailable position of royalty,
which more closely parallels the American doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity.1 65 Second, the Court did not justify its judgment as a requirement
of either international or municipal law."" There is no evidence that
the Court proceeded through an in-depth analysis of the various fac-
tors as was done in Schooner Exchange. 1 7 Rather it appears to rest,
sub silentio, on a judicially created doctrine of deference and on the
rigid application of a static rule.' Third, the Court acknowledged a
role for the Executive in the judicial process. "That these were facts of
which the court is bound to take judicial notice, and for information as
to which it may consult the Department of State, there can be no
doubt."' 9 This act of state doctrine, with its silent reliance on sover-
eign immunity, became a talisman for future courts.
7 0
In the years following Underhill the courts continued to apply an
act of state doctrine which had its roots in sovereign immunity and
international law principles.' 7' In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 73
159. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
160. Id. at 250.
161. Id. at 252.
162. See infra text accompanying note 167.
163. 168 U.S. at 252.
164. Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 9 Eng. Rep. 993 (1848), cited in
Singer, supra note 158, at 284, 291.
165. See Singer, supra note 158, at 291.
166. 168 U.S. at 252.
167. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
168. See 168 U.S. at 252.
169. Id. at 253.
170. See Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
171. See id.
172. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
[Vol. 3
POWERS IN CONFLICT
where the suit was in replevin for hides which were confiscated in Mex-
ico by General Villa for governmental purposes during the Mexican
Revolution and eventually transported to the United States, the Su-
preme Court held for the defendant on the basis that the confiscation
was an act of state even when the acts were by a revolutionary group
which later came to power.178 The Court expanded the rationale for its
decision, finding that it "rests upon the highest considerations of inter-
national comity and expediency."
17'
The concept of an executive suggestion which would assert that
the act of state doctrine did not apply developed in Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme 7  and Bernstein v. N.V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,'7  the Bernstein
cases. The plaintiff, who sought to recover property which had been
expropriated by Nazis during World War II, had been frustrated by
the courts' application of the act of state doctrine which resulted in the
courts' refusal to pass judgment on the validity of the Nazi seizures.'77
Jack B. Tate, Acting State Department Legal Advisor, wrote a letter
"as a matter of general interest"178 to the district court which
originated the "Bernstein exception" wherein the Executive suggested
that the court not apply act of state.'
7 9
The policy of the Executive, with respect to
claims asserted in the United States for the resti-
tution of identifiable property (or compensation
in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or du-
173. Id. at 303-04.
174. Id.
175. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
176. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
177. 163 F.2d at 246. Judge Learned Hand, speaking in the first Bernstein case,
broadly hinted that act of state might not apply if the Executive stated that it would not
be appropriate. Id. at 249.
178. 210 F.2d at 376.
179. Id. The court in this case, and in the previous Bernstein cases, did not un-
dertake an analysis which took into account the various demands and expectations. Ob-
viously not deferred to was the common demand that expropriations by Nazis not be
honored through the application of the act of state doctrine. The Court in Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964), observed that:
[r]ecognizing the odious nature of this act of state, the court,
through Judge Learned Hand, nonetheless refused to consider
it invalid on that ground. Rather, it looked to see if the Execu-
tive had acted in any manner that would indicate that United
States Courts should refuse to give effect to such a foreign de-
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ress as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is
to relieve American courts from any restraint
upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials.'
The court followed this suggestion and held for the plaintiff.6 1
The Bernstein exception brings the Executive into the middle of
the judicial process in a manner which is nearly identical to the sugges-
tion mechanism which had existed in the area of sovereign immu-
nity.1 86 Heretofore, act of state, while an exception to the rule of law,
was nonetheless basically a judicial decision.1 83 While it is true that the
result of Bernstein cannot be criticized, it is important to note that it
came with great cost to the independence of the Judiciary.6
The landmark act of state case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino 6 explicitly did not rule on the Bernstein exception.' The Su-
preme Court instead found that act of state was not rooted in interna-
tional law, 7 but in the constitutional separation of powers.6 6 The
180. 210 F.2d at 376.
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 124-45.
183. See Underhill, 168 U.S. at 253, where the Court states that it may "consult"
with the State Department.
184. The courts here did not state what law was to be employed, but rather
waited for the Executive Branch to indicate to the Judiciary what law should be applied.
There was no interest of either the Executive Branch or the government of the United
States which would have precluded adjudication of this case by the courts. The courts
instead took a rigid view of the act of state doctrine and deferred to executive findings
and suggestion. This acceptance of suggestion blurs the concept of an independent Judi-
ciary and instead moves the courts into a role later characterized as an "errand boy." See
infra note 210.
185. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
186. 376 U.S. at 420. "This Court has never had occasion to pass upon the so-
called Bernstein exception, nor need it do so now." Id.
187. Id. at 421. "We do not believe that this doctrine is compelled either by the
inherent nature of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier decisions seem to imply
... or by some principle of international law." Id. Justice Harlan's conception of inter-
national law and act of state was supported by the current commentary which stated
that the act of state doctrine was "a principle of judicial self-restraint and deference to
the role of the executive or political branch of government in the field of foreign affairs."
INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOcIATION, REP. FiFrHIErH CONF. 155 (Brussels 1962), quoted in
Lillich, supra note 57, at 28-29.
188. 376 U.S. at 423. "The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitu-
tional' underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationship between branches of govern-
ment in a system of separation of powers." Id. Later in the opinion Justice Harlan
stated:
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on
federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither inter-
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Court, with Justice Harlan speaking for the majority, found that the
courts should avoid deciding the validity of foreign acts so as to not
embarrass the Executive."'9
In arriving at this decision, Justice Harlan fundamentally
changed the nature of the act of state doctrine from a doctrine of non-
justiciability rooted in elements of international law"90 to a doctrine of
nonjusticiability which was a hybrid form of political question. 9 Jus-
tice Harlan's reliance on the possibility that the Executive Branch
might be hindered by judicial actions parallels the language of Baker v.
Carr,"' the current statement of the political question doctrine.
Justice White dissented in an opinion which clearly stated that
the rule of law should apply, especially in a case where a violation of
national law nor the Constitution, its continuing vitality de-
pends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of func-
tions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.
Id. at 427.
189. Id. at 431-33.
Judicial determinations of invalidity of title can, on the
other hand have only an occasional impact, since they depend
on the fortuitous circumstance of the property in question be-
ing brought into this country. Such decisions would, if the acts
involved were declared invalid, often be likely to give offense
to the expropriating country; since the concept of territorial
sovereignty is so deep seated, any state may resent the refusal
of the courts of another sovereign to accord validity to acts
within its territorial borders. Piecemeal dispositions of this
sort involving the probability of affront to another state could
seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on by the
Executive Branch and might prevent or render less favorable
the terms of an agreement that could otherwise be reached.
Id. at 431-32.
190. See discussion of Underhill, supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
191. This shift towards a political question analysis was immediately recognized
by Justice White in his dissent, 376 U.S. at 461, and Justice Brennan in his dissent in
First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. 759, 787-88 (1972).
192. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Compare the Court's statement in
Baker, "[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is...
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question," id. at 217, with Harlan's determination that "[s]uch a decision
now would require the drawing of more difficult lines in subsequent cases and these
would involve the possibility of conflict with the Executive view. Even if the courts
avoided this course. . . the very expression of judicial uncertainty might provide embar-
rassment to the Executive Branch." 376 U.S. at 433. Compare also Justice Harlan's lan-
guage, supra note 188 with Justice Brennan's full exposition of political question, infra
note 274 and accompanying text. This comparable language underscores Justice Harlan's
subtle but substantial shift in defining the nature of act of state.
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international law is alleged.""8 Justice White's opinion, in contrast to
the majority, analyzed the demands of all the actors, both parties and




Congress, concerned with the ruling in Sabbatino, sought to "re-
verse"' 95 it with the Hickenlooper or Sabbatino Amendment, ' " some-
times referred to as the Rule of Law Amendment. '7 The stated pur-
pose of the amendment, which was greatly concerned with the
demands of the claimant,199 was to provide for a process where "the
Court would presume that it may proceed with an adjudication on the
merits unless the President states officially that such an adjudication
in the particular case would embarrass the conduct of foreign
policy."' 99
193. 376 U.S. at 339-40.
194. Id. at 462. "And it cannot be contended that the Constitution allocates this
area to the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive, for the judicial power is expressly
extended by that document to controversies between aliens and citizens or states, aliens
and foreign states and American citizens or states." Id. See also McDougal & Jasper,
supra note 37, at 62-67.
195. S. REP. No. 1188, Part 1, 88th Cong., 2nd Sesa. 24, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3829, 3852 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
196. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d)(4), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
The Sabbatino Amendment states:
Notwithstanoiing any other provision of law, no court in
the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal
act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in
which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by
any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confisca-
tion or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of international law, includ-
ing the principles of compensation and the other standards set
out in this subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph shall
not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign
state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a
claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to
an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days dura-
tion issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation
or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the
President determines that application of the act of state doc-
trine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is
filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
Id.
197. Leigh & Atkeson, pt 1, supra note 57, at 858.
198. Id. at 868-69.
199. SENATE REPORT, supra note 195, at 3852.
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It is interesting to note that by codifying a method by which the
President could suggest act of state Congress was paralleling the con-
temporary sovereign immunity process.2 " Although the sovereign im-
munity process of suggestion has been eliminated by the F.S.I.A.,2' 0
and the Bernstein exception has been under attack,202 this vestigial
characteristic of executive suggestion remains2 0 3 It should also be
noted that the Sabbatino Amendment has been found not to be appli-
cable in some cases2O4 with results which have stirred significant
controversy.
205
The Bernstein exception was severely attacked in First National
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.2 0 6 In this case the petitioner
counterclaimed in a suit for excess payments stating that the value of
the confiscated property should be used as a set-off.207 The Supreme
Court found, in a plurality decision, that the counterclaim was not
barred by the act of state doctrine. The plurality rested its rationale
upon a communication from the State Department stating that the act
of state doctrine should not apply.208 Although the plurality opinion of
Justice Rehnquist supported the Bernstein exception, 2 0 six other jus-
tices, two concurring and four dissenting, rejected Bernstein.2 10 This
200. See supra text accompanying notes 124-45.
201. See supra text accompanying note 147.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 206-10.
203. Senator Charles M. Mathias has introduced a bill which, if enacted, would
preclude the courts from applying act of state. See S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Mathias Bill].
204. See Buttes Gas & Oil, 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972); Hunt (Coastal States), 583 S.W.2d 322, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992, reh'g
denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1979), both discussed infra text accompanying notes 227-36.
205. See criticism in McDougal & Jasper, supra note 37, at 44 n.68.
206. 406 U.S. 759 (1971).
207. Id. at 761.
208. Id. at 768.
209. Id. at 768. "In so doing, we of course adopt and approve the so-called 'Bern-
stein' exception to the act of state doctrine." Id.
210. Justice Douglas, concurring in the result, stated, "[ilt is that principle [rec-
ognition of counterclaim], not the Bernstein exception, which should govern here. Other-
wise, the Court becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may choose
to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not others." Id. at 772-773.
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, also rejected the Bernstein exception:
I do not agree, however, that balancing the functions of the
judiciary and those of the political branches compels the judi-
ciary to eschew acting in all cases in which the underlying is-
sue is validity of expropriation under customary international
law. Such a result would be an abdication of the judiciary's
responsibility to persons who seek to resolve their grievances
by the judicial process.
19821
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
case had the effect of moving the Court toward a position where it
would be able to adjudicate a claim against a foreign state on the mer-
its. In so moving the adjudication process, the Court explicitly recog-
nized and balanced some of the competing demands.
The act of state doctrine, as reflected in the
cases culminating in Sabbatino, is a judicially ac-
cepted limitation on the normal adjudicative
processes of the courts, springing from the thor-
oughly sound principle that on occasion individ-
ual litigants may have to forego decision on the
merits of their claims because the involvement of
the courts in such a decision might frustrate the
conduct of the Nation's foreign policy. It would
be wholly illogical to insist that such a rule, fash-
ioned because of fear that adjudication would in-
terfere with the conduct of foreign relations, be
applied in the face of an assurance from that
branch of the Federal Government that conducts
foreign relations that such a result would not
obtain.2 1'
This movement away from the rigid application of act of state
toward a presumption of justiciability continued in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba.2 12 There, Justice White borrowed a concept from
the sovereign immunity cases and refused to apply act of state "to acts
committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commer-
cial operations."2 13 In so holding the Court tended to follow the State
Unless it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction would
interfere with delicate foreign relations conducted by the po-
litical branches, I conclude that federal courts have an obliga-
tion to hear cases such as this.
Id. at 774-76.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun in dissent,
stated:
As six members of this Court recognize today, the reasoning of
that case [Bernstein] is clear that the representations of the
Department of State are entitled to weight for the light they
shed on the permutation and combination of factors underly-
ing the act of state doctrine. But they cannot be
determinative.
Id. at 790.
211. Id. at 769-70.
212. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
213. Id. at 706.
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Department's suggestion contained in a so called "Bernstein' 2 4 let-
ter.2 15 The Court refused, however, to follow the final State Depart-
ment suggestion that Sabbatino be overruled and that act of state
questions be adjudicated under international law.2 16 We thus have the
incongruous situation of the Executive Branch interjecting itself into
the judicial process through the letter,' suggesting to the Judiciary
that it ought to decide future cases by the rule of law, and the Judicial
Branch hesitating." 8
Yet perhaps even more significant is Justice White's recognition
that in both act of state and sovereign immunity cases, a balancing test
is applicable.2 1 " The test which Justice White used evaluated the po-
tential injury to the rule of law against possible damage to the Execu-
tive's foreign policy.2 0 The consistent recognition and application of
such a balancing test, with an understanding and evaluation of all per-
tinent factors, would do much to advance the rule of law.
In spite of this progressive movement, the courts have recently
narrowed the Dunhill decision and the liberalizing theories it repre-
sents. The courts have found support for narrowing these theories in
the traditional political question 22 and sovereign immunity22 concepts
by finding potential embarrassment to the Executive Branch as a ra-
tionale for nonadjudication2 2 In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.2 24 the court
214. This letter was characterized by Justice Marshall in his dissent as a "Bern-
stein" letter. Id. at 724.
215. For the text of this "Bernstein" letter, see id. at 706.
216. Id. at 697 n.12. "The letter also takes the position that the overruling of
Sabbatino, so that acts of state would hereafter be subject to adjudication in American
Courts under international law, would not result in embarrassment to the conduct of
United States foreign policy. We need not to resolve this issue either." Id.
217. The letter was written by Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor to the State Depart-
ment. Id. at 711.
218. Id. at 697 n.12.
219. Id. at 705 n.18.
It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the proper application of
each [act of state and sovereign immunity] involves a balanc-
ing of the injury to our foreign policy, the conduct of which is
committed primarily to the Executive Branch, through judicial
affronts to sovereign powers,. . . against the injury to the pri-
vate party, who is denied justice through judicial deference to




221. See infra text accompanying note 275.
222. See supra text accompanying note 127.
223. See, e.g., Hunt (Mobil), 550 F.2d at 77.
224. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
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of appeals held that an antitrust claim would require an examination
of a Libyan act of expropriation.22 0 The court found that Hunt's claim
did not come under the commercial activities exception to act of state
as the acts were of a political nature.
22 6
In Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co.,2 21 Hunt tried
again, this time in a case alleging conversion of his Libyan oil.22s The
Texas Supreme Court found that Hunt did not fall within the Sabba-
tino Amendment 22 exception to the act of state doctrine as a contrac-
tual right, not a property right, was expropriated.2 3 0 This determina-
tion was made in spite of State Department policy supporting Hunt
and cited by the dissent.2 3 1
Two cases similar to the Hunt litigation, Occidental Petroleum
Corporation v. Buttes Gas & Oil Company,2 and Occidental of Umm
al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo,233 involved an antitrust suit re-
garding. an oil concession agreement and a later suit for conversion of
the oil, respectively. The courts again found the act of state doctrine to
be significant.3 4 In the first case the district court found that the al-
leged conspiracy regarding the establishment of the Trucial State
Sharjah's boundary, which embraced the concession area, was a politi-
cal question235 the adjudication of which was barred by the act of state
doctrine. " ' In the second case, the court of appeals relied primarily on
the political question doctrine,2 3 7 recognizing potential embarrassment
to and hindrance of the Executive Branch'" and noting the Executive
Branch's letter of suggestion to that effect.2 3 9 In an incredible step
away from the rule of law, the court interpreted recent Supreme Court
decisions as showing that the federal courts "are becoming more ame-
nable to receiving opinion by the Executive branch.
2 40
225. Id. at 72.
226. Id. at 73.
227. 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992, reh'g denied, 444 U.S.
1103 (1979).
228. Id. at 323.
229. See supra'fiote 196.'
230. 583 S.W.2d at 325-26.
231. Id. at 334-35.
232. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), cert denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
233. 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
234. See Buttes Gas & Oil, 331 F. Supp. at 113; Umm al Qaywayn, 577 F.2d at
1201.
235. 331 F. Supp. at 103.
236. Id. 'at 108.
237. 577 F.2d at 1201.
238. Id. at 1204.
239. Id. at 1204 n.13.
240. Id. at 1204 n.14. It is interesting to note that this case, Umm al Qaywayn,
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Recently, in International Association of Machinists v. Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries,2 41 the court of appeals again
relied on that dubious concept of hindrance of executive function2 4s in
applying act of state. The appellate court applied the political question
aspect of act of state in determining that the potential violation of an-
titrust laws by O.P.E.C. was nonjusticiable .
4
3
We have seen, therefore, two act of state doctrines emerge. The
first is the traditional approach, where the courts will not judge a for-
eign sovereign's acts within its own territory. 4 4 The second is more
expansive and rests on the political question foundation by proposing
that the courts will not adjudicate when the act might be political2 45 or
might interfere with the functioning of the Executive.24 It is unfortu-
nate that courts do not consistently utilize the balancing test articu-
lated and applied by Justice White in Dunhill. 47 If they did apply that
test, they would move toward a rule of law which would be in step with
has been litigated in the English courts. The House of Lords recently found it to be
nonjusticiable, not because of embarrassment to Her Majesty's Government, but because
of a lack of judicial standards. Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer, slip op. at 16 (House
of Lords, Oct. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Hammer]. But see discussion of concurring and
dissenting opinions in First Nat'l City Bank, supra note 210.
241. 477 F. Supp. 553 ( C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
242. 649 F.2d at 1358-59. It is also interesting to note the that the English courts
found that potential embarrassment was not a barrier to adjudication. See Hammer, slip
op. at 16.
243. 649 F.2d at 1360-61.
244. Although the courts do not blindly adopt the Underhill language, modern
cases have shown some strained analyses. See Hunt (Coastal States), 583 S.W.2d 322
(Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1979), where the court
followed the classic interpretation of act of state, see supra note 161 and accompanying
text, while acknowledging, but not addressing, the political question aspects of act of
state. It is interesting to note that the court adopted the act of state finding of Hunt
(Mobil), 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977), without adopting the
embarrassment to the Executive political question rationale. This may be because the
State Department supported Hunt, in Hunt (Coastal States), undermining the potential
for political embarrassment. Hunt (Coastal States), at 334. Thus, if the embarrassment
foundation which supported the prior finding of act of state is removed, the Hunt
(Coastal States) court would appear to be forced to rely heavily on the traditional act of
state rationale.
245. Cf. Hunt (Mobil), 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977),
where the court uttered language closely paralleling the political question doctrine in
finding that the case was controlled by act of state. "Another inquiry could only be
fissiparous, hindering or embarrassing the conduct of foreign relations which is the very
reason underlying the policy of judicial abstention expressed in the doctrine in issue [act
of state]." Id. at 77-78.
246. See supra text accompanying note 238.
247. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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both the expressed demands of the actors248  and progressive
commentary.2 4
c. Political Question
The political question doctrine250 will generally251 be applied
when the courts determine a particular case raises issues which are too
complex for adjudication;25 2 when an issue should properly be decided
by the Executive Branch;25 3 or when it might impair the function of
the Executive. 25 4 Although this concept is, in its most narrow exposi-
tion, a constitutional imperative, 55 it has nonetheless been expanded
through judicial decision.2 56
The political question traces its heritage to the classic case of
Marbury v. Madison in which Chief Justice Marshall described poten-
tial questions which could be constitutionally committed to the Execu-
tive.2"57 He thus created, through the force of the following language, an
exception to the rule of law which he had so energetically advocated in
the opinion.
2 58
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on
the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the
248. See the Sabbatino Amendment, supra note 196; Mathias Bill, supra note
203.
249. See generally McDougal & Jasper, supra note 37.
250. See generally Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961);
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Scharph,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517
(1966); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959).
251. See L. HENKIN, supra note 37. "That there is a constitutional 'political
question' doctrine is not disputed, but there is little agreement as to anything else about
it-its constitutional basis; whether abstention is required or optional; how the courts
decide whether a question is 'political,' and which questions are." Id. at 210.
252. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 111; see also text accompanying
notes 267-68.
253. Umm al Qaywayn, 577 F.2d at 1204; see supra notes 237-240 and accompa-
nying text.
254. Umm al Qaywayn, 577 F.2d at 1204.
255. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), which both adopted and built upon the theory advanced in Marbury, dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 271-81.
256. See infra text accompanying notes 271-81.
257. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
258. Id. at 163. Chief Justice Marshall, prior to his exception-creating language,
had clearly articulated the rule of law: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly con-
sists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury." Id.
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executive or executive officers, perform duties in
which they had a discretion. Questions in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never
be made in this court." 9
Chief Justice Marshall, by defining an area of legal questions to be po-
litical and nonjusticiable, enunciated the parameters of a legal doctrine
into which future cases would wander with uncertainty of result.'
The concept of a constitutionally mandated political question was
used by the Supreme Court in resolving cases concerning the sover-
eignty of disputed islands21 including Jones v. United States.'62 In
Jones, the Court held that the determination of an island's sovereign
was an executive function, " and a political question was found. In
these cases the Court stayed within the parameters of Chief Justice
Marshall's declaration that a political question is one which deals with
an executive function delimited by the Constitution.2"
The concept of a political question was expanded by Justice Jack-
son in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp.' 5 wherein the certification of foreign air routes was held to be a
political question . 6 6 The Court paid homage to constitutional consid-
erations while broadening the criteria for deciding whether an issue
was a political question with statements about delicate, complex
problems.'67
But even if the courts could require full dis-
closure, the very nature of executive decisions as
to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such de-
cisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to
259. Id. at 170.
260. See infra text accompanying notes 282-92.
261. See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
"And can there be any doubt, that when the executive branch of the government, which
is charged with our foreign relations, shall in its correspondence with a foreign nation
assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the
judicial department?" Id.
262. 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
263. The Court stated, "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory
is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges .... " Id. at
212.
264. The recognition of a foreign sovereign is an executive function enumerated
in the Constitution, the President "shall receive Ambassadors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
265. Chicago & S. Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 111.
266. Id. at 114.
267. Id. at 111.
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the political departments of the government, Ex-
ecutive and Legislative. They are delicate, com-
plex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare
they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry.2"
This opinion departs from the implied criteria of Chief Justice
Marshall by suggesting that complexity, information availability and
elective position should be criteria for judicial abstention. By incorpo-
rating these new elements, which in part reflect the "embarrass-
ment"' 6 ' arguments from sovereign immunity, the Court was failing to
evaluate the totality of demands and expectations which were within
the judicial process. Among the ignored demands was the common ex-
pectation that the courts will adjudicate claims which come before
them on the merits.
270
The modern exposition of the doctrine of political question was
made in Baker v. Cart.27' The Court, in deciding the justiciability of a
legislative apportionment case, formulated a number of situations in
which a political question could arise. The first criteria was Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's constitutional commitment.272 Justice Brennan then
stated other categories:
7 3
It is apparent that several formulations
which vary slightly according to the settings in
which the questions rise may describe a political
question, although each has one or more elements
which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of
any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
268. Id.
269. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 258; Housz Rzolrr, supra note 25, at 6607.
271. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
272. See supra text accompanying note 259.
273. 369 U.S. at 217.
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and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's under-
taking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question. 7'
Later in the opinion, while specifically discussing foreign affairs,
Justice Brennan recognized that a number of factors could influence
the determination of a political question:
There are sweeping statements to the effect
that all questions touching foreign relations are
political questions. Not only does resolution of
such issues frequently turn on standards that
defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of
a discretion demonstrably committed to the exec-
utive or legislature; but many such questions
uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the
Government's views. Yet it is error to suppose
that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our
cases in this field seem invariably to show a dis-
criminating analysis of the particular question
posed, in terms of the history of its management
by the political branches, of its susceptibility to
judicial handling in the light of its nature and
posture in the specific case, and of the possible
consequences of judicial action.2 7 5
Although this decision has been criticized as failing to distinguish
various types of political questions,'76 it stands as the latest and fullest
274. Id.
275. Id. at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
276. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 37, at 212.
But the Court's selection and summary of the precedents did
not reduce the confusion which they had engendered, for it
failed to recognize that 'political questions' had been used in
different cases in different senses to describe different kinds of
questions as to which the functions of the courts were
different.
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definition of the political question doctrine.
The Court has not, in Baker v. Carr, adopted a narrow definition
of political question focusing only on Chief Justice Marshall's constitu-
tional commitment.27 Rather, it has expanded the doctrine to include
Justice Jackson's suggestion of complexity as a basis for a political
question' 78 and other elements which in part reflect the "embarrass-
ment" arguments from sovereign immunity.27 9 It is interesting to note
that the concept of political question deference has not been limited
during recent decades by judicial and legislative actions as have the act
of state,8 0 and sovereign immunity81 doctrines. The political question
doctrine is, in theory, at its broadest level, with a potential for abuse as
an exception to the rule of law.
Recent years have seen the courts apply, or attempt to apply, the
concept of political question in a variety of circumstances.2 82 Justice
Brennan found the concept of political question dispositive in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba28 where he dissented
from the majority finding that the counterclaim was outside the re-
strictions of act of state.28 "[Tihe sensitivity of the issues to national
concerns, and the power of the Executive alone to effect a fair remedy
for all United States citizens who have been harmed all point toward
the existence of a 'political question.' "285 Justice Brennan is, as his
Id. at 212-213. Henkin described his concept of a political question in Henkin, supra
note 250, at 622.
I see its proper content as consisting of the following proposi-
tions: 1) The courts are bound to accept decisions by the polit-
ical branches within their constitutional authority. 2) The
courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the powers
of the political branches where the Constitution does not pre-
scribe any. 3) Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions
imply rights and standing to object in favor of private parties.
4) The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of
equity. 5) In principle, finally, there might be constitutional
provisions which can properly be interpreted as wholly or in
part "self-monitoring" and not the subject of judicial review.
Id.
277. See supra text accompanying note 259.
278. See supra text accompanying note 267.
279. See supra text accompanying note 127.
280. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
282. See infra text accompanying notes 283 & 288 for illustrations of judicial
interpretations of the political question doctrine.
283. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).




footnotes and other language suggest, articulating the Sabbatino act of
state/political question position.2"
The shadow of executive suggestion appears in Occidental of
Umm at Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo."' There the court of ap-
peals found the adjudication of an international boundary dispute to
be a political question. 88 The question regarding this case comes not
from the end result, which seems reasonable given the lack of judicial
standards,2 8' but rather from the court's reliance on executive sugges-
tion2 0 found in a State Department letter.291 The court said:
Just as the judiciary will follow an executive
determination as to which nation has sovereignty
over a disputed area. . . so must the judiciary re-
fuse to decide the dispute in the absence of exec-
utive action because of the absence of that direc-
tion. Additionally, we are persuaded that a
judicial determination would reflect a lack of re-
spect for the executive branch, particularly the
State Department.
292
The movement in recent years has been away from executive sug-
gestion 9 3 as it has been criticized as a response to political pressures,
not an attempt to further the rule of law.2" Thus, an acceptance of a
suggestion of political question as seen in Umm al Qaywayn29 5 may lay
the foundation for the deprivation of remedy for a claimant on a broad
and possibly unjustified basis. There are three reasons why the practice
of accepting suggestions is particularly fraught with danger in the area
of political question. First, the tradition in the Judiciary has been to
286. Id. at 787-88. See also supra text accompanying note 191 regarding thV
evolution of the political question within act of state.
287. 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
288. Id. at 1201.
289. In a parallel case the House of Lords found the question to be nonjusticia-
ble relying in part on the rationale of Umm al Qaywayn in finding a lack of judicial
standards. See Hammer, slip op. at 16.
290. 577 F.2d at 1204.
291. Letter from Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Advisor, to James W. Moormen, As-
sistant Attorney General, reprinted in 1978 DIG. U.S. PRAc. INT'L L. 926. "It is the posi-
tion of the United States that the determination of boundary disputes between foreign
nations frequently raises a nonjusticiable political question and that, in any event, the
determination of the boundary dispute in this case raises such a question." Id.
292. 577 F.2d at 1203-04.
293. See supra notes 147-51 & 206-11 andaccompanying text.
294. See Leigh & Atkeson, pt. 2, supra note 57, at 19; House REPORT, supra note
25, at 6606.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 287-92.
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defer to executive suggestions when they are made.2'9 Second, the cri-
teria for deference given in Baker v. Carrs7 are broad, providing for
potential determination on constitutional,"'8 lack of judicial standard'"
and prudential0 0 bases. Third, there have been no congressional at-
tempts to limit the use of judicial application of political question as
there have been in the act of state
01 and sovereign immunity areas.
3
02
If "political question" becomes the catch all description for the
discarded bogeymen of doctrines past, such as embarrassment of the
Executive in sovereign immunity3 "1 and respect for foreign sovereignty
in the Underhill days of act of state,304 and if there are numerous sug-
gestions from the Executive on a broad base of criteria, then the di-
lemma might become not which cases are nonjusticiable political ques-
tions, but which cases are not.
As a partial solution, the courts in considering political question
cases might borrow the balancing test of the kindred act of state doc-
trine.3 0 5 The extensive and intensive analyses of the demands of the
various actors as suggested by this test would help to ensure that those
cases which are truly nonjusticiable political questions will be left
unadjudicated, while those which can be fully evaluated, and which are
not constitutionally committed to another branch, are decided accord-
ing to the rule of law.
d. The Settlement of Claims by Presidential Action
The settlement of the claims of nationals against a foreign state
by agreement between states has been cited as established interna-
tional practice . 3" This practice, where a nation such as the United
States espouses the claim of its injured national to the foreign state,
296. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); pre-F.S.I.A. sovereign immunity cases: Mexico, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), Peru, 318 U.S.
578 (1943); Umm at Qaywayn, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928
(1979).
297. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
298. Id. at 210.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
304. See supra text accompanying note 163.
305. For a discussion of Justice White's balancing test, set out in DunhiU, 425
U.S. at 705 n.18, see supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
306. L. HENKIN, supra note 37, at 262. "International agreements settling claims
by nationals of one state against the government or nationals of another are established
international practice reflecting traditional international theory." Id.
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has been a traditional method of remedy when the individual has been
powerless to protect his own interests. 07 In the United States this
practice has been formalized in the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission. 08 We recently witnessed an almost bizarre twist to this prac-
tice when the President vacated a valid judgment against a foreign
state, removed an attachment of property and transferred the claim
from the American courts to a settlement tribunal.30' This action by
the Executive is the opposite of a judicial settlement. The question dis-
cussed in this section is when, if ever, does this practice of claim settle-
ment intrude upon the authority of the Judiciary? When, if ever, does
a practice, which developed originally to further the rule of law by pro-
viding a remedy for an injured party, actually disrupt the rule of law
by imposing a political settlement?
The ability of a President to transfer claims and judgments which
are validly within the American judicial process to a settlement tribu-
nal is a recent phenomenon. 10 Prior to this time, cases concerning
claims against foreign states focused on the relationship between the
government and the individual. When the individual had no remedy in
United States courts, the individual invoked the protection of the gov-
ernment and its espousal of his claim. 1 Upon full examination, how-
ever, it can be seen that the right and demand of an individual to an
adjudication of a claim on the merits, and the fulfillment of a judg-
ment, if any, presupposes the existence of an authoritative forum
where adjudication can take place. 1 The process of claim settlement
and transfer involves the invocation of many demands and expecta-
tions. Two such demands are the demand of an individual to a hearing
on the merits s3 and the common demand that the courts of the United
307. Id.
For while a private claimant may be able to recover under the
laws of his own country or that of the debtor (or even of some
third country), in international law the individual and his debt
have no independent existence: his claim is only a right of his
government against that of the debtor.
Id.
308. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
309. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
310. As discussed in text accompanying infra note 311, the Executive had previ-
ously engaged in claim settlement on behalf of individual claimants. Dames & Moore is
the first case where the Executive sought to transfer a claimant's judgment to a settle-
ment tribunal over the protests of the claimant.
311. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886).
312. Id. at 393. "A right often exists where there is no remedy, and a most fre-
quent illustration of this is found in the relation of the subject to his sovereign, the
citizen to his Government." Id.
313. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163, where the Court stated that: "The
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States be allowed to fulfill their constitutional function.3 1 4
Traditionally in international law, a claimant, often because of his
inability to secure jurisdiction over the foreign state, has been forced to
rely on the government to secure a settlement of his claim. 31 5 After
settlement, payments to the claimants have been described as "pay-
ments as of grace and not right."31 6 Yet there have been a number of
cases which concerned the question of whether the settlement of a
claim constituted a taking of property requiring compensation under
the fifth amendment.
31 7
In a famous advisory opinion the Court of Claims reported to
Congress on the liability of the United States to individual claimants
against France, whose claims had been an element of treaty negotia-
tion. The Court of Claims discussed this concept:
It seems to us that this "bargain" . . . by
which the present peace and quiet of the United
States, as well as their future prosperity and
greatness were largely secured, and which was
brought about by the sacrifice of the interests of
individual citizens, falls within the intent and
meaning of the Constitution, which prohibits the
taking of private property for public use without
just compensation.1 8
The Supreme Court examined the "taking" question in two
cases-11 arising out of the Litvinov Assignment.3 0 In these cases the
United States was seeking to enforce claims against the holders of
property seized by the Soviet government, claims which had been
transferred to the United States as part of the settlement. The Court
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id.
314. This demand was most strongly articulated by the Hon. Herbert J. Stern
who posed and answered his own question, "When should the courts defer to the foreign
policy needs of the United States? Never!" Address by Hon. Herbert J. Stern (U.S. Dist.
Ct. Judge, N.J.), International Law Association, Annual International Law Weekend
(Nov. 13, 1981).
315. L. HENKIN, supra note 37, at 262.
316. Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439, 457 (1896).
317. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937). See also United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952);
Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
318. Gray, 21 Ct. Cl., at 393.
319. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
320. Litvinov Assignment, Nov. 16, 1933, United States-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 11
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIcA
1248 (C.I. Bevans ed. 1974).
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found that the claims had been properly assigned by the Soviet Union
to the United States.3 2 1 The Court also found that there was no fifth
amendment question and emphasized the fact that the United States
Constitution did not protect aliens abroad from the practices of their
own country. In Belmont the Court stated:
[T]he answer is that our Constitution, law and
policies have no extraterritorial operation, unless
in respect of our own citizens. . . . The substan-
tive right to the moneys, as now disclosed, became
vested in the Soviet Government as the successor
to the corporation; and this right that government
has passed to the United States. It does not ap-
pear that respondents have any interest in the
matter beyond that of a custodian. Thus far no
question under the Fifth Amendment is
involved.
3 22
In Pink, also, the Court found that there was no taking:
By the same token, the Federal Government is
not barred by the Fifth Amendment from secur-
ing for itself and our nationals priority against
such creditors.
3 23
Through this interpretation of the Constitution, and by relying
on executive powers exercised in the recognition of a foreign state, the
Court ratified the ability of the United States to settle the claims of
aliens against a foreign state without subjecting the United States to
liability under the takings clause"2 4 of the Constitition.
A citizen claimant has, however, been able to successfully bring a
claim for a taking of property, independent of a claim settlement. In
Seery v. United States2 6 a naturalized citizen brought a claim for an
alleged taking of her foreign property by United States troops. The
court, implicitly distinguished the constitutional protection of a citizen
vis-a-vis the noncitizens in the Litvinov cases, and found that an agree-
ment regarding claim settlement could not nullify the plaintiff's consti-
tutional rights.
26
321. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
322. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332.
323. Pink, 315 U.S. at 228.
324. U.S. CONST. amend. V states "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." Id.
325. 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
326. Id. at 608.
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Whatever may be the true doctrine as to formally
ratified treaties which conflict with the Constitu-
tion, we think that there can be no doubt that an
executive agreement, not being a transaction
which is even mentioned in the Constitution, can-
not impair Constitutional rights.
3 2 7
In the already controversial3 28 Dames & Moore v. Regan,323 the
Supreme Court found that the President had the power to nullify at-
tachments, to transfer assets and to transfer claims to an arbitral panel
as per the Iranian Agreements. 30 The Court relied on the traditional
notions of executive power in foreign affairs, statutory authorization
and congressional approval through acquiescence in reaching its
conclusion.3 1
The Court analyzed the case in two parts. It first addressed the
nullification of attachments and the transfer of assets"3 2 and then the
transfer of claims from the courts of the United States to a Claims
Settlement Tribunal.33
In regard to the first question, the Court applied the tripartite
test from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer "' finding that the
President's actions had been authorized by statute,333 and that the use
of the assets as a "bargaining chip"$" was not constitutionally
impermissable.
3 7
The Court found no such statutory authorization for the suspen-
327. Id. at 606. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
328. See McDougal & Jasper, supra note 37, at 73 n.112.
329. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
330. See Agreements, supra note 40.
331. 453 U.S. at 688.
332. Id. at 669-74.
333. Id. at 675-88.
334. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
335. 453 U.S. at 662. The President had acted under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
336. 453 U.S. at 673.
337. Id. at 674.
Because the President's action in nullifying the attachments
and ordering the transfer of the assets was taken pursuant to
specific congressional authorization, it is "supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heav-
ily upon anyone who might attack it." Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. Justice Powell, dissenting, stated that "[tihe decision [regarding the attachments]
may well be erroneous, and it is certainly premature. . . ." Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
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sion of claims.s83 The Court relied, however, on congressional acquies-
cence to the power of the President to settle claims8 8 ' and the nature
of the case 40 to find this action constitutional. '41 The Court also found
that the President did not divest the courts of authority. In an attempt
to address the demand of the courts for respect and the common de-
mand for authoritative decisions, the Court stated:
In the first place, we do not believe that the Pres-
ident has attempted to divest the federal courts
of jurisdiction. Executive Order No. 12294 pur-
ports only to "suspend" the claims, not divest the
federal courts of "jurisdiction." As we read the
Executive Order, those claims not within the ju-
risdiction of the claims tribunal will
"revive" .... 42
The Court went on to state that although a fifth amendment question
arising from the suspension of claims was not ripe, it nonetheless
would be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims."
8
338. Id. at 675.
339. Id. at 682.
340. Id. at 688.
341. Id.
But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been deter-
mined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and
where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in
the President's action, we are not prepared to say that the
President lacks the power to settle such claims.
Id.
342. Id. at 684. This language seems inadequate on its face. It would seem that
when a claim is transferred, it is gone, not "suspended," regardless of any future poten-
tial for resurrection. The President has removed the claims from the United States
courts, threatening petitioner's judgment and damaging the rule of law. The flow of deci-
sions, and the F.S.I.A., have tended to expand the ability of the courts to adjudicate
claims on the merits free from political influence, no matter how well intentioned. This
case, unfortunately, has held contrary to this trend based on a seemingly semantic
distinction.
343. Id. at 688-90. But see the dissent of Justice Powell where he stated:
The Government must pay just compensation when it
furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargain-
ing chips" claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons and
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts (footnote omitted).
The extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon
which our decision rests cannot, in the circumstances of this
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It remains to be seen whether Dames & Moore becomes a leading
case justifying Presidential intervention in the judicial process, or if it
is just a minor fibrillation in response to the stress of a crisis situation.
It also remains to be seen whether the majority reasoning in regard to
a fifth amendment taking question prevails or whether proper consid-
eration is given to the rule of law as advanced by the dissent."4'
CONCLUSION
Through the course of this note there has been an examination of
the courts' acceptance of executive suggestions based on quasi-consti-
tutional principles," 5 traditional legal theories, 4 and various attempts
at statutory solutions.347 The result has been that claimants have, for
one reason or another, been denied adjudication on the merits of their
claims. It might be productive for the courts to adopt an analysis of
each case which would recognize the necessary role of the Executive,
the expectation of the claimant that his case will be adjudicated on the
merits, and the function of the courts under the Constitution.
This analysis might include:
1. A presumption that it is the constitutional role of the courts,
and the expectation of the people, the President, the Congress, and the
litigants that the courts will decide those cases which come before
them on the merits unless there is a clear, significant and convincing
reason for deferring or refusing an adjudication.
2. A reduction in the emphasis given to the traditional theories
called act of state and sovereign immunity .based on the modern day
realization that the massive and voluntary injections of nation states
344. Id. Mr. Justice Powell has recognized the trend in decisions which protect
the rights of a defendant to have just compensation when the government takes his
property. This case may be distinguished from Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), and Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937), in that the claimant is an American national and the taking oc-
curred in the United States.
In addition the F.S.I.A. has provided the mechanism for claims against foreign
states, which has greatly increased the possibility of recovery by a claimant against a
foreign state, without reliance on governmental claim negotiations. Indeed in the present
case the petitioner had secured a judgment. There would seem to be convincing support
for Justice Powell's contention that the "taking" claims should have been left "open for
resolution on a case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims." 453 U.S. at 690.
Interestingly, the government did not raise the defense that the taking was for the
public good in an emergency and, therefore, did not require compensation. See, e.g.,
Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
345. See, e.g., Umm al Qaywayn, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 928 (1979) (relying on the political question doctrine).
346. See, e.g., Underhill, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
347. See, e.g., F.S.I.A., supra note 23.
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into the stream of world commerce has lessened the applicability of
these doctrines. It can no longer be validly and steadfastly asserted, as
it was over ninety years ago, that the courts will not judge the acts of a
foreign state undertaken within their own boundaries.3 4 8 The obvious
modern day rejoinder is "why not?" Although the traditional answers
of deference to sovereignty, comity between nations and possible em-
barrassment to the Executive, might be offered, they are, in the latter
part of the twentieth century, less than persuasive. It seems evident
that, in the face of rapidly changing demands and expectations, any
doctrinaire application of static rules, whether they are labeled act of
state, sovereign immunity, or are given another name, will not consist-
ently advance the rule of law, but rather will result in a lack of just and
authoritative decisions.
3. Any deviation from an adjudication on the merits should be
permitted only after an extensive analysis utilizing the balancing test
that was employed by Justice White in DunhiL."'
Any executive suggestion, whether direct or indirect, made
through letter, amicus brief or taken by judicial notice, should be ex-
amined for its sufficiency in both authority and competence. Authority
means the source of presidential power, derived from the Constitution,
statutes, or case precedent, to suggest deference in any given situation.
Competence means the appropriateness of the suggestion in the specfic
situation. In order to be sufficient in authority, the President must be
operating on the basis of his constitutional authority or in conjunction
with the authority of Congress. An appropriate analysis would employ
the spectrum of authority test that Justice Rehnquist utilized in
Dames & Moore: Is the President acting within his own constitutional
authority, with congressional consent, against congressional intent, or
with congressional silence? 50 After determining the adequacy of the
President's ability to act, the court must review his competence to in-
ject himself into the judicial process and circumvent the rule of law.
An appropriate question might be whether the presidential act is jure
imperii. Does it embody the sovereignty of the nation, and is it done
for reasons of national imperative? Or is it a political reaction to for-
eign stimuli?
The result of this analysis will be that any presidential action will
be within one of four grades of sufficiency:"'1
348. See Underhil, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
349. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
350. 453 U.S. at 668-69.
351. If the individual steps are analyzed in more detail, such as in Justice Jack-
son's three part test for authority used in Youngstown Sheet, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 86-89, the number of grades will increase.
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(a) High Authority/High Competence-An example of this high-
est grade of sufficiency can be seen in a hypothetical case with facts
similar to the Buttes Gas & Oil case where the boundary of a foreign
state was at issue."8 ' The President would operate with the highest au-
thority, under his constitituional power to receive ambassadors,35 3 and
with the highest competence, as the recognition of sovereignty is an act
which is of great national importance, 5 4 if he suggested the sovereignty
of the disputed territory or suggested that the court forego
adjudication.
(b) High Authority/Low Competence-A hypothetical case dem-
onstrating this possibility can be seen in a situation where the Presi-
dent, relying on the statutory authorization of the Sabbatino Amend-
ment,355 suggests to the court that act of state be applied, yet the
decision is highly political in nature involving little of national interest.
(c) Low Authority/High Competence-The suspension of the
claim in Dames & Moore-" illustrates this category. There the Presi-
dent, operating with high competence, was effecting national policy of
the greatest magnitude. The Supreme Court, however, was hard
pressed to find a base of authority for this action.
(d) Low Authority/Low Competence-The controversial Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, S.A. case,3 57 a decision criticized as highly political, 3"
and resting on the now rejected practice of suggestion in sovereign im-
munity cases,8 59 stands as an example of this grade.
Based on this comprehensive two-step analysis the court can es-
tablish whether the Executive has met the requirements of authority
and competence that are needed to overcome the presumption in favor
of adjudication on the merits.
4. In the case of the settlement or transfer of claims, the courts
should apply the two-part test outlined above. The court should decide
whether the forced settlement or forced'transfer constituted a taking
of property under the fifth amendment. This act can be examined, in
the last part of this suggested test, as to whether the taking was for the
"public good" 3 0 when compensation would be unnecessary.
352. See discussion of Buttes Gas & Oil, supra text accompanying notes 232-36.
353. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-3.
354. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
355. See Sabbatino Amendment, supra note 196.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 330-31.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
358. See Leigh & Atkeson, pt. 2, supra note 57, at 19.
359. See supra text accompanying note 146.
360. See, e.g., Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (where the Court refused to find a
taking when property was destroyed through war).
[Vol. 3
1982] POWERS IN CONFLICT 241
The analysis outlined above will tend to systematize the process
of adjudicating a claim against a foreign state with the result that a
claimant will have a greater certainty of an adjudication on the merits,
or, in the alternative, the claimant will find some solace in the knowl-
edge that adjudication was deferred after an in-depth review of twenti-
eth century concerns and progressive constitutional and statutory
interpretation.
Robert C. Boneberg

